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THE MONSTER UNLEASHED: HOW HOBBY LOBBY THREATENS
THE FREEDOM OF EMPLOYEES TO PRACTICE RELIGION
Chad DeVeaux*
“You are my creator, but I am your master; Obey!”1
From the earliest days of the Republic, our courts recognized that
“the right to conduct business in the form of a corporation, and . . . to enter
into relations of employment with individuals, is not a natural or
fundamental right.”2 Rather, “[a] corporation is an artificial being, invisible,
intangible, and existing only in contemplation of the law.”3 It is “presumed
to be incorporated for the benefit of the public” and “receives certain special
privileges” to effectuate this purpose.4 Thus, it was understood that the
Government “may qualify the privilege by imposing such conditions and
duties as reasonably may be deemed expedient, in order that [a]
corporation’s activities may not operate to the detriment of the rights of
others with whom it may come in contact.”5
But somewhere along the way, the servants became the masters. In
contemporary America, for-profit corporations have become “private
lawmakers”6 that “control many aspects of [our] lives,” which in days past
lied within the ambit of the State.7 These new-age sovereigns do not answer
*

Associate Professor of Law, Concordia University School of Law; LL.M., Harvard
Law School; J.D., University of Notre Dame Law School. This Essay was first delivered as
a lecture entitled, Hobby Lobby: The Debate, sponsored by the Federalist Society at
Concordia University School of Law on September 10, 2014. Jeff Mateer, General Counsel
to the Liberty Institute, offered competing viewpoints. I am gratefully indebted to
Mr. Mateer for his participation at the event, and to Anne Mostad-Jensen for her (always)
invaluable help researching and preparing both my lecture and this Essay. Many thanks are
also due the editors and staff of the Concordia Law Review for their hard work preparing it
for publication. Any mistakes are mine.
1
MARY SHELLEY, FRANKENSTEIN 149 (Signet Classic ed., Penguin Books 1983)
(1831).
2
Prudential Ins. Co. v. Cheek, 259 U.S. 530, 536 (1922); accord Trs. of Dartmouth
Coll. v. Woodward, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 518, 636 (1819).
3
Dartmouth Coll., 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) at 636.
4
Hale v. Henkel, 201 U.S. 43, 74–75 (1906).
5
Prudential Ins., 259 U.S. at 536.
6
C & J Fertilizer, Inc. v. Allied Mut. Ins. Co., 227 N.W.2d 169, 174 (Iowa 1975).
7
Casarotto v. Lombardi, 886 P.2d 931, 940 (Mont. 1994) (Trieweiler, J., concurring);
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to their constituents at the ballot box.8 Yet they exercise profound influence
over the outcome of our elections.9 In fact, “their interests” all too often
“conflict in fundamental respects with the interests of eligible voters.”10
In 1931, the late commercial-law scholar Maurice Wormser
authored Frankenstein, Incorporated, a tome that compares the modern
corporation to Mary Shelley’s gothic beast—an “artificially created and
vitalized . . . monster which became the terror of ‘all living things.’”11
Likewise, “[c]orporations are not natural living persons, but artificial
beings, corpora ficta. They are created by the nation or state, which endows
them with distinct personality in the eye of the law, special privileges and
comprehensive powers.”12 And just as “Frankenstein’s creature developed
into a deadly menace to its creator,” Wormser prophetically warned that if
efforts were not undertaken to “curb certain grave and vicious abuses” we,
like Shelley’s nineteenth century anti-hero, will find ourselves at the mercy
of our “corporate offspring,” which “like a cancerous growth,” threatens to
“poison the body politic.”13
The Roberts Court’s decisions in Citizens United 14 and Hobby
accord C & J Fertilizer, 227 N.W.2d at 174.
8
C & J Fertilizer, 227 N.W.2d at 174.
9
Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310, 396 (2010) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (The
influence that corporations currently possess in the political process “threatens to
undermine the integrity of elected institutions across the Nation.”).
10
Id. at 394.
11
I. MAURICE WORMSER, FRANKENSTEIN, INCORPORATED v (1931).
12
Id.
13
Id. at vi.
14
Citizens United, 558 U.S. 310. Recognizing that “the special characteristics of the
corporate structure require particularly careful regulation,” the pre-Citizens United case law
recognized that the Constitution permitted the Government to limit for-profit corporations’
aggregate political expenditures. FEC v. Nat’l Right to Work Comm., 459 U.S. 197, 209–
10 (1982). These limits were viewed as necessary to protect the electoral process from “the
corrosive and distorting effects of immense aggregations of wealth that are accumulated
with the help of the corporate form.” Austin v. Mich. Chamber of Commerce, 494 U.S.
652, 660 (1990). Precedent recognized that such protections are particularly important
because for-profit corporations’ ability to impact the outcome of elections has “little or no
correlation to the public’s support for the corporations’ political ideas.” Id. The Citizens
United Court repudiated this well-settled anti-distortion principle and struck down federal
laws restricting independent political expenditures by for-profit corporations. Citizens
United, 558 U.S. at 349. In Citizens United’s aftermath, the United States’ elector system
has witnessed unprecedented “[i]ncreased outside spending” which has “exacerbate[d] the
‘polarizing, attack orientation of contemporary political advertising’” and “heighten[ed] the
potential capture of officials by interest groups—long the central concern of campaign
finance regulation.” Garrick B. Pursley, The Campaign Finance Safeguards of Federalism,

116

THE MONSTER UNLEASHED

Vol. 1

Lobby15 represent the realization of Professor Wormser’s worst fears.
Christ warned us that “No one can serve two masters. . . . You
cannot serve both God and money.” 16 Apparently, this commandment
applies only to mortals. Hobby Lobby says closely held for-profit
corporations can do both at the same time.17 The decision also makes it
much harder for the employees of such entities to honor their own religious
precepts.
I make my living formulating and expounding ideas—usually
controversial ones.18 I stand before you a practicing Catholic (albeit not
63 EMORY L.J. 781, 785 (2014). This transformation has fundamentally changed the
electoral process:
Elected officials have different incentives now: If they say the right
things and vote the right way, they gain access to a new unlimited
mountain of campaign money; but if they act against outside-group
interests, they face the prospect of that mountain supporting a challenger.
This dramatically increases the influence of large donors over federal
officials’ agendas.
Id. at 785–86. And, predictably, post-Citizens United America has been plagued by
unprecedented hyper-partisanship and dysfunction. See Chad DeVeaux, The Fourth Zone
of Presidential Power: Analyzing the Debt-Ceiling Standoffs Through the Prism of
Youngstown Steel, 47 CONN. L. REV. 395, 425–31 (2014) [hereinafter DeVeaux, The
Fourth Zone of Presidential Power] (arguing that recent congressional disregard for the
historical norms that govern the relationship between the three branches of the federal
government threatens the stability of American democracy).
15
Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751 (2014). The Hobby Lobby
Court found that a for-profit closely held corporation was exempt from a federal law
dictating “that nonexempt employers are generally required to provide ‘coverage, without
cost sharing’ for ‘[a]ll Food and Drug Administration . . . approved contraceptive methods,
sterilization procedures, and patient education and counseling.’” Id. at 2762 (quoting 77
Fed. Reg. 8725). The Court concluded that this requirement “substantially burden[ed] the
[corporation’s] exercise of religion.” Id. at 2759. The majority applied the “leastrestrictive-means standard,” ultimately concluding that the requirement did not satisfy this
“exceptionally demanding” standard because the Government itself could simply provide
the contraceptives to employees at its own expense. Id. at 2780.
16
Matthew 6:24 (New American Bible).
17
Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. at 2759.
18
See e.g., Chad DeVeaux & Anne Mostad-Jensen, Fear and Loathing in Colorado:
Invoking the Supreme Court’s State-Controversy Jurisdiction to Challenge the MarijuanaLegalization Experiment, 56 B.C. L. REV. 1829, 1837–43 (2015) (arguing that Colorado’s
decriminalization of marijuana has created an unconstitutional transboundary nuisance and
Colorado should be required to pay damages to neighboring jurisdictions); DeVeaux, The
Fourth Zone of Presidential Power, supra note 14, at 422–25 (arguing that if Congress fails
to raise the debt ceiling before the Treasury exhausts its funds, Congress’s incompatible
instructions invest the president with discretion to unilaterally borrow funds in excess of
the debt ceiling, cancel federal programs, or raise taxes); Chad DeVeaux, A Tale of Two
Searches: Intrusive Civil-Discovery Rules Violate the Fourth Amendment, 46 CONN. L.
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exactly what some of my fellow parishioners would call a practical one), a
political progressive, and an unrepentant gadfly.
Yet, in twenty-first century America, I do not harbor much fear that
the authorities will come knocking at my door because of the ideas I
profess.19 Rather, my concerns are more practical. I, like many Americans,
worry far more about losing my job than running afoul of the Government.
And, after Hobby Lobby, I would be concerned if I worked for a closely
held, for-profit corporation—a denomination that encompasses ninety
percent of American businesses 20 —including such behemoths as Koch
Industries, Cargill, and Chrysler.21 Such entities employ more than fifty-two
percent of our work force.22
The Hobby Lobby Court interpreted and applied the Religious

REV. 1083, 1101–06 (2014) (arguing that the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure’s
permissive document-production provisions violate the Fourth Amendment); Chad
DeVeaux, Lost in the Dismal Swamp: Interstate Class Actions, False Federalism, and the
Dormant Commerce Clause, 79 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 995, 1055–63 (2011) (arguing that
the certification of nationwide class actions under the law of a single state violates the
dormant Commerce Clause).
19
I will be forced to reevaluate this view in the unlikely event that Donald Trump is
elected president. As one commentator recently noted:
Since he announced his candidacy, Trump has threatened to ignore those
who are carping about free speech and shut down parts of the Internet; he
has promised to summarily deport those who are suspected of being
illegal immigrants, without due process of law; he has endorsed
extensive campaign-finance regulations that fly directly in the face of the
First Amendment; he has vowed to restrict the Second Amendment rights
of those on the terror watch list, again without due process; he has
praised Franklin Roosevelt’s internment of American citizens, suggested
that natural-born Americans can be deported against their will, and
proposed that American Muslims be barred from reentering the country;
he has described as “wonderful” a Supreme Court ruling that obliterated
the “public use” limitations on the invocation of eminent domain; and he
has refused to rule out registering Americans on the basis of their faith.
Charles C. W. Cooke, Trump, the Anti-Constitutional Authoritarian—Liberty Lovers,
Beware, NAT’L REV. (Dec. 8, 2015, 5:01 PM), http://www.nationalreview.com/article/4282
08/trump-anti-constitutional-authoritarian.
20
Aaron Blake, A Lot of People Could be Affected by the Supreme Court’s Birth
Control Decision—Theoretically, WASH. POST (June 30, 2014), http://www.washingtonpos
t.com/blogs/the-fix/wp/2014/06/30/a-lot-of-people-could-be-affected-by-the-supreme-court
s-birth-control-decision/.
21
Shlomo Reifman & Andrea D. Murphy, America’s Largest Private Companies,
FORBES (Nov. 6, 2008, 6:00 PM), http://www.forbes.com/2008/11/03/largest-privatecompanies-biz-privates08-cx_sr_1103private_land.html.
22
Blake, supra note 20.
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Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA).23 Congress enacted RFRA in 1993 in
response to the Supreme Court’s decision in Employment Division v.
Smith24 three years earlier, which repudiated the doctrine of Sherbert v.
Verner. 25 Sherbert and its progeny—which were embraced by both the
Warren26 and Burger Courts27—recognized that “governmental actions that
substantially burden” an individual’s “religious practice must be justified by
a compelling governmental interest.” 28 Smith rejected these precedents,
positing that “the right of free exercise [of religion] does not relieve an
individual of the obligation to comply with a ‘valid and neutral law of
general applicability on the ground that the law proscribes (or prescribes)
conduct that his religion prescribes (or proscribes).’”29 RFRA asserts that its
purpose is to “restore the compelling interest test as set forth in Sherbert v.
Verner” 30 —which applied only to individuals. 31 But despite Congress’s
unambiguously stated intent to merely “restore . . . Sherbert,”32 Hobby
Lobby concluded that the statute does “more than merely restore . . .
Sherbert.” 33 The Court concluded that RFRA empowers for-profit
corporations to disregard legal obligations to their employees.34
23

Religious Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA) of 1993, Pub. L. No. 103–141, 1993
U.S.C.C.A.N. (107 Stat.) 1488.
24
Emp’t Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990) ), superseded by statute, Religious
Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA) of 1993, Pub. L. No. 103–141, 1993 U.S.C.C.A.N. (107
Stat.) 1488.
25
Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963).
26
Id.
27
E.g., Thomas v. Review Bd., 450 U.S. 707, 718 (1981); Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406
U.S. 205, 215 (1972).
28
Smith, 494 U.S. at 883 (citing Sherbert, 374 U.S. at 402–03).
29
Id. at 879 (quoting United States v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252, 263 n.3 (1982)).
30
42 U.S.C. § 2000bb-1(b) (2012).
31
Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751, 2794 (2014) (Ginsburg, J.,
dissenting) (“[N]o decision of this Court [has] recognized a for-profit corporation’s
qualification for a religious exemption from a generally applicable law . . . under the Free
Exercise Clause.”).
32
42 U.S.C. § 2000bb-1(b) (2012).
33
Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. at 2761 n.3 (citing City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507,
509 (1997)). In support of this argument, the Court disingenuously asserted that “RFRA’s
‘least restrictive means requirement was not used in the pre-Smith jurisprudence RFRA
purported to codify.’” Id. (quoting Flores, 521 U.S. at 509). This is not so. The Sherbert
line of cases explicitly recognized that governmental impairment of an individual’s
religious exercise can only be justified “by showing that” the governmental action “is the
least restrictive means of achieving some compelling state interest.” Thomas v. Review
Bd., 450 U.S. 707, 718 (1981).
34
Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. at 2769. “As enacted in 1993, RFRA applied to both the
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By recognizing for the first time that the right to exercise religion
can exempt a for-profit corporation from laws governing its obligations to
its employees, the Court has opened a Pandora’s box that undermines the
stability of laws prohibiting employment discrimination and sexual
harassment, and ultimately threatens the free-exercise rights of employees
whose religious convictions differ from those of their employers. As a
former professor of mine observed, by putting an employer’s free-exercise
rights above its employees, Hobby Lobby sent the clear message “that more
money buys you more religious freedom—and more freedom to infringe on
the choices of others.”35
“Implicit” in the Free-Exercise right afforded by the First
Amendment is “a corresponding right to associate with others in pursuit
of . . . religious . . . ends.”36 The “freedom . . . to worship . . . could not be
vigorously protected from interference by the State [if] a correlative
freedom to engage in group effort toward those ends were not also
guaranteed.” 37 This, in turn, affords a religious entity the right to
disassociate itself from individuals “it does not desire”—to expel those who
“may impair the ability of the group to express those views, and only those
views, that it intends to express.”38 “Forcing [religious organizations] to
accept [unwanted] members may impair the ability of the group to express
those views, and only those views, that it intends to express.”39 “Protection
of [a religious organization’s] right to define its membership derives from
the recognition that the formation of an expressive association is the
creation of a voice, and the selection of members is the definition of that
voice.”40
But historically the Court always recognized that this right is limited
Federal Government and the States.” Id. at 2761. Congress relied on Section 5 of the
Fourteenth Amendment for the authority to impose RFRA’s requirements on state actors.
Id. at 2769. But in 1997, the Supreme Court held that while RFRA’s limitations upon
federal actors were valid, “Congress had overstepped its Section 5 authority” in attempting
to apply RFRA’s restrictions to state actors. Flores, 521 U.S. at 533–34.
35
Cathleen Kaveny, ‘A Minefield’: The Troubling Implications of the Hobby Lobby
Decision, COMMONWEAL (July 7, 2014, 6:38 PM), https://www.commonwealmagazine.org
/print/36155.
36
Boy Scouts of Am. v. Dale, 530 U.S. 640, 647 (2000).
37
Roberts v. U.S. Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 622 (1984).
38
Dale, 530 U.S. at 648.
39
Id.
40
Roberts, 468 U.S. at 633 (O’Connor, J., concurring).
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to “expressive associations”—associations whose primary function is
advocacy of political or religious beliefs.41 By contrast, a “commercial
association,” an enterprise “engaged in [for-profit] commercial activity,”
enjoys no “right to choose employees, customers, suppliers or those with
whom [it] engages in simple commercial transactions.”42
This distinction rested on the common-sense understanding that
“[r]eligious organizations exist to foster the interests of persons subscribing
to the same religious faith.”43 This is “[n]ot so of for-profit corporations”—
“[w]orkers who sustain the operations of those corporations commonly are
not drawn from one religious community.”44 Thus, “[o]nce it enters the
marketplace of commerce in any substantial degree,” the Court recognized
that an enterprise sheds certain First Amendment rights “that it would
otherwise enjoy if it confined its affairs to the marketplace of ideas.”45
The Sherbert line of cases that RFRA reinvigorated expressly
recognized this distinction. “When followers of a particular sect enter into
commercial activity as a matter of choice, the limits they accept on their
own conduct as a matter of conscience and faith are not to be superimposed
on the statutory schemes which are binding on others in that activity.”46
Granting exemptions from neutral and generally applicable statutes
governing obligations to employees “operates to impose the employer’s
religious faith on the employees.”47
But Hobby Lobby eviscerates this distinction. Half-heartedly
acknowledging the historical principle that “nonprofit corporations are
special because furthering their religious ‘autonomy often furthers
individual religious freedom as well,’” the Court asserts that “this principle
applies equally to for-profit corporations: furthering their religious freedom
also ‘furthers individual religious freedom.’”48 The revolution that began
41

Id.
Id. at 634–35; accord United States v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252, 261 (1982) (“When
followers of a particular sect enter into commercial activity as a matter of choice, the limits
they accept on their own conduct as a matter of conscience and faith are not to be
superimposed on the statutory schemes which are binding on others in that activity.”).
43
Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751, 2795 (2014) (Ginsburg, J.,
dissenting).
44
Id.
45
Roberts, 468 U.S. at 636 (O’Connor, J., concurring).
46
Lee, 455 U.S. at 261.
47
Id.
48
Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. at 2769 (quoting Corp. of Presiding Bishop v. Amos, 483
42
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with Citizens United thus reached its logical conclusion.49 Hobby Lobby
similarly concluded that the “profit-making objective” no longer provides a
valid justification for distinguishing corporate First Amendment rights.50
The Court proffers this remarkable proposition without any
acknowledgment of its earth-shifting consequences.51
If for-profit corporations enjoy the same free-exercise rights as their
non-profit counterparts, do they not also have the right to disassociate
themselves from employees (and customers) that do not embody their
religious beliefs; to fire those who exercise their rights to worship (or not
worship), to vote, or to speak in a manner that contradicts the employer’s
religious convictions; to deny service to patrons they view as unclean?52
During the 2004 presidential election, several bishops of my own faith
threatened to deny communion to congregants who voted for John Kerry
because he supported abortion rights.53 After Hobby Lobby, do for-profit
corporations with Catholic convictions have the right to terminate
employees who vote or campaign for such candidates?
For its part, the Hobby Lobby majority attempts to deflect these
concerns by noting that the decision does not sanction “discrimination in
U.S. 327, 342 (1987) (Brennan, J., concurring).
49
The Citizens United Court proclaimed that “[i]t is irrelevant for purposes of the First
Amendment that corporate funds may have little or no correlation to the public’s support
for the corporation’s political ideas.” Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310, 351 (2010).
50
Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. at 2769–72.
51
See generally id. at 2751.
52
See Boy Scouts of Am. v. Dale, 530 U.S. 640, 648 (2000) (“Forcing” religious
organizations “to accept” unwanted “members may impair the ability of the group to
express those views, and only those views, that it intends to express.”).
53
Laurie Goodstein, Bishop Would Deny Rite for Defiant Catholic Voters, N.Y. TIMES
(May 14, 2004), http://www.nytimes.com/2004/05/14/us/bishop-would-deny-rite-fordefiant-catholic-voters.html. Ironically, other Catholic leaders might regard a vote for Mr.
Kerry’s political adversaries to be morally illicit as well. As a prominent Benedictine
theologian observed:
I do not believe that just because you’re opposed to abortion, that that
makes you pro-life. In fact, I think in many cases, your morality is deeply
lacking if all you want is a child born but not a child fed, not a child
educated, not a child housed. And why would I think that you don’t?
Because you don’t want any tax money to go there. That’s not pro-life.
That’s pro-birth. We need a much broader conversation on what the
morality of pro-life is.
Leslie Salzillo, Catholic Nun Explains Pro-Life in a Way that Will Stun Many (Especially
Republican Lawmakers), DAILY KOS (July 30, 2015, 5:00 AM), http://www.dailykos.com/s
tory/2015/07/30/1407166/-Catholic-Nun-Explains-Pro-Life-In-A-Way-That-May-Stun-The
-Masses#.
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hiring . . . on the basis of race” because “[t]he Government has a
compelling interest in providing an equal opportunity to participate in the
workforce without regard to race.”54 But the opinion is conspicuously silent
about the status of laws that prohibit discrimination in employment and
public accommodations on the basis of religion.
The ability to exclude those who do not share a religious
organization’s views is central to its free-exercise rights.55 For this reason,
federal law has long exempted non-profit religious corporations from laws
that prohibit considering one’s faith when making employment decisions.56
Yet courts uniformly recognized that by “engag[ing] in business for profit”
a corporation has “passed over the line that affords them” the right to
consider religion when making hiring or promotional decisions.57 Hobby
Lobby has erased this line.
The Court’s logic suggests that compelling a fundamentalist-run
enterprise like Hobby Lobby to employ an otherwise-qualified, yarmulkewearing Orthodox Jew or headscarf-wearing Muslim, at the very least,
interferes with the exercise of a sincerely held belief.58 At a minimum, this
54

Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. at 2783 (emphases added).
As Justice Alito averred, advocating the Christian Legal Society’s right to limit
membership to those of its own denomination:
Not all Christian denominations agree with CLS’s views on sexual
morality and other matters. During a recent year, CLS had seven
members. Suppose that 10 students who are members of denominations
that disagree with CLS decided that CLS was misrepresenting true
Christian doctrine. Suppose that these students joined CLS, elected
officers who shared their views, ended the group’s affiliation with the
national organization, and changed the group’s message. The new
leadership would likely proclaim that the group was “vital” but rectified,
while CLS, I assume, would take the view that the old group had suffered
its “demise.” Whether a change represents reform or transformation may
depend very much on the eye of the beholder.
Christian Legal Soc’y Chapter of the Univ. of Cal., Hastings Coll. of the Law v. Martinez,
561 U.S. 661, 740 (2010) (Alito, J., dissenting).
56
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-1 (2012).
57
State v. Sports & Health Club, Inc., 370 N.W.2d 844, 853 (Minn. 1985); accord
United States v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252, 261 (1982).
58
“Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(m) . . . makes it
unlawful for an employer to take a variety of adverse employment actions (such as failing
or refusing to hire a job applicant or discharging an employee) ‘because of’ religion.” Tex.
Dep’t of Hous. & Cmty. Affairs v. Inclusive Cmtys Project, Inc., 135 S. Ct. 2507, 2533
(2015) (citing EEOC v. Abercrombie & Fitch Stores, Inc., 135 S. Ct. 2028 (2015)). Title
VII also requires employers to make “reasonabl[e] accommodat[ions]” to dress codes for
an employee’s “religious observance or practice[s]”—like headscarves and yarmulkes—if
55
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means that to enforce federal laws preventing a closely held for-profit
corporation from terminating an employee on the basis of her faith, the
Government must establish that the measure furthers “a compelling
interest,” and that the requested remedy constitutes “the least restrictive
means of achieving that interest”—strict scrutiny—“the most demanding
test known to constitutional law.” 59 But it only gets worse. The Court
cannot relieve the Government of this burden by simply upholding laws
preventing religious discrimination in the first such case that reaches its
docket.
Hobby Lobby “requires the Government to demonstrate that the
compelling interest test is satisfied through application of the challenged
law ‘to the person’—the particular claimant whose . . . exercise of religion
is being substantially burdened.”60 Thus, a reviewing court must “look[]
beyond broadly formulated interests justifying the general applicability of
[a] government mandate[]”; it must “scrutinize[] the asserted harm of
granting specific exemptions to [the] particular religious claimants” before
it. 61 Thus, every employee challenging an employer’s action that
discriminates on the basis of religion must make an individualized showing
that the remedies the law afford her constitute the “least restrictive means”
of achieving the Government’s interest as applied to her particular
employer and its particular practices. 62 Even if the courts rule for
employees in a majority of cases, the transaction costs imposed upon
plaintiffs and federal authorities charged with stifling workplace
discrimination, like the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, are
mind-boggling.63 Indeed, the prospect of the coming judicial onslaught led
Texas Senator Ted Cruz to boast that Hobby Lobby has opened the door for
“cases made by hundreds more plaintiffs” to “wend their way through the
courts.”64
they can do so “without undue hardship” to the “employer’s business.” Abercrombie &
Fitch Stores, Inc., 135 S. Ct. at 2031–32 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(j)).
59
City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 534 (1997), rev’d 134 S. Ct. 2751 (2014).
60
Gonzales v. O Centro Espirita Beneficente Uniao do Vegetal, 546 U.S. 418, 430–31
(2006) (emphasis added).
61
Id. at 431.
62
Id.
63
See Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1972, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(a) (2012)
(tasking EEOC with enforcing laws prohibiting discrimination in the workplace).
64
Kevin Horrigan, Editorial, In Hobby Lobby, Court Rules Some Beliefs Are More
Equal than Others, ST. LOUIS POST-DISPATCH (June 30, 2014, 5:00 PM),
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This is madness.
I am both a political advocate and a person of faith. I hold and
espouse views that in some respects differ from my employer’s. If I had any
other job, I would be very worried now.65
But I enjoy a privilege shared by very few American workers: I am
blessed to be part of a profession that embraces the concept of academic
freedom.66 The first rule of the legal academy is that I can express my
opinions—political, religious, and otherwise—free of fear that my
employment will be threatened because my views do not comport with the
sensibilities of my employer.67
Questions regarding aspects of my private life—who I live with,
what medical treatments I consent to, what church I attend, and my marital
status—are none of my employer’s business.68
I owe this license to private benefactors: the American Bar
Association,69 the Association of American Law Schools,70 and the constant
http://www.stltoday.com/news/opinion/columns/the-platform/editorial-in-hobby-lobby-cou
rt-rules-some-beliefs-are-more/article_5834140f-42f1-505c-afe1-2f3349da3b3f.html.
65
I recognize that this sentiment might violate Matthew 6:25. See Matthew 6:25 (New
American Bible) (“Therefore I tell you, do not worry . . . .”). We lawyers have a difficult
time heeding this command.
66
Academic freedom is “[t]he right . . . to speak freely about political or ideological
issues without fear of loss of position or other reprisal.” Academic Freedom, BLACK’S LAW
DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014).
67
Paul D. Carrington, Freedom and Community in the Academy, 66 TEX. L. REV.
1577, 1577 (1988) (“We members of the academic community are to be protected from the
adverse consequences that persons may impose when they are hostile to the ideas we
express.”); 2015–2016 Standards and Rules of Procedure for Approval of Law Schools,
AM. BAR ASS’N, http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/publications/misc/legal_edu
cation/Standards/2015_2016_chapter_4.authcheckdam.pdf (last visited Sept. 1, 2015).
68
See BYLAWS ASS’N AM. L. SCHOOLS, art. VI, § 6–3(a) (2008), https://www.aals.org/
about/handbook/bylaws/ (last visited Nov. 11, 2015) (directing law schools “shall provide
equality of opportunity . . . for . . . faculty and employees with respect to hiring,
continuation, promotion and tenure . . . without discrimination or segregation on the ground
of race, color, religion, national origin, sex, age, disability, or sexual orientation.”); see also
Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 602 (2003) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (noting that “any
reputable law school must seek to belong” to “the American Association of Law Schools
[sic]” and lamenting that AALS “excludes from membership any school” that does not
abide by the organization’s exacting prohibitions against discrimination on the basis of
familial status and private conduct); George W. Dent, Jr., Toward Improved Intellectual
Diversity in Law Schools, 37 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 165, 167 (2014) (noting that
“AALS standards are de facto mandatory for serious law schools”).
69
See 2015–2016 Standards and Rules of Procedure for Approval of Law Schools,
Appendix 1: Statement on Academic Freedom and Tenure, AM. BAR ASS’N, http://www.am
ericanbar.org/content/dam/aba/publications/misc/legal_education/Standards/2015_2016_ap
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vigilance of my brothers and sisters in tweed.71 After Hobby Lobby though,
I do not owe it to the Government.72
Ironically, I am an employee of the Lutheran Church—an institution
that likewise embraces the freedoms of conscience and of expression73—but
nonetheless just the sort of establishment upon whom the Framers actually
intended to bestow a greater prerogative with respect to employment.74 Yet,
pendices.authcheckdam.pdf (last visited Jan. 30, 2016) (stating law professors “are entitled
to full freedom in research and in the publication of the results” and “in the classroom”).
70
See BY-LAWS ASS’N AM. L. SCHOOLS, art. VI, § 6–6(d) (2008), https://www.aals.org
/about/handbook/bylaws/ (last visited Nov. 7, 2015) (“A faculty member shall have
academic freedom . . . .”).
71
See Protecting Academic Freedom, AM. ASS’N UNIV. PROFESSORS,
http://www.aaup.org/our-work/protecting-academic-freedom (last visited Nov. 8, 2015)
(“Protecting academic freedom is the AAUP’s core mission. Academic freedom is the
indispensable requisite for unfettered teaching and research in institutions of higher
education.”). The ABA’s law-school accreditation standards incorporate AAUP’s own
academic-freedom standards. 2015–2016 Standards and Rules of Procedure for Approval
of Law Schools, Appendix 1, supra note 69. These standards take an expansive view of
academic freedom. For example, AAUP recently censured Louisiana State University for
terminating a professor “known for . . . her use of profanity, poorly worded jokes, and
sometimes sexually explicit jokes in her methodologies.” Academic Freedom and Tenure:
Louisiana State University, Baton Rouge, a Supplementary Report on a Censured
Administration, AM. ASS’N UNIV. PROFESSORS, http://www.aaup.org/report/academicfreedom-and-tenure-louisiana-state-university-baton-rouge-supplementary-report
(last
visited Nov. 13, 2015). Censuring LSU for violating the tenets of academic freedom,
AAUP observed that the “University’s level of tolerance for speech that people may find
offensive . . . seems astonishingly low . . . .” Id.
72
As a private “expressive association,” AALS enjoys a First Amendment right to
disassociate itself from law schools that do not abide by its academic freedom and
antidiscrimination rules—to expel those who “may impair the ability of the group to
express those views, and only those views, that it intends to express.” Boy Scouts of Am. v.
Dale, 530 U.S. 640, 648 (2000). Because “any reputable law school must seek to belong”
to AALS, the organization’s membership rules constitute de facto requirements for all
United States law schools. Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 602 (Scalia, J., dissenting); accord Dent,
supra note 68, at 167 (noting that “AALS standards are de facto mandatory for serious law
schools”).
73
Enhancing Faith-Based Cooperation for Religious Freedom and Expression,
LUTHERAN WORLD FED’N (Mar. 13, 2015), https://www.lutheranworld.org/news/enhancing
-faith-based-cooperation-religious-freedom-and-expression (highlighting
“humanitarian
cooperation” between “[t]he Lutheran World Federation” and “the Islamic Relief
Worldwide” to facilitate “meaningful actions that help to enhance open-mindedness and
open-heartedness towards freedom of expression and freedom of religion in society”).
74
See Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church v. EEOC, 132 S. Ct. 694, 697
(2012) (“Requiring a church to accept or retain an unwanted minister . . . intrudes upon
more than a mere employment decision. Such action interferes with the internal governance
of the church, depriving the church of control over the selection of those who will
personify its beliefs.”).
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after Hobby Lobby, I, as a church employee, enjoy greater protections from
the imposition of my employer’s religious beliefs than do the 13,000
employees of Hobby Lobby, Inc.—a for-profit, big-box chain store,
primarily engaged in the sale of cheap, foreign-made arts and crafts
supplies75; a company that enjoyed $3.3 billion in revenues in 2013.76
The Minnesota Supreme Court’s decision in State v. Sports and
Health Club, Inc.77 illustrates the nature of the forbidden fruit sampled by
the Hobby Lobby majority. The defendant there was a “closely held, forprofit . . . corporation” that operated seven health clubs in the Minneapolis
area. The club restricted managerial positions to “born-again Christians”
and frequently questioned all its employees about their church attendance
and sexual behavior. 78 The club admitted that it would “not hire, and
[would] fire, individuals living with but not married to a person of the
opposite sex; a young, single woman working without her father’s consent
or a married woman working without her husband’s consent; a person
whose commitment to a non-Christian religion is strong; and [those it
suspected might be] . . . fornicators and homosexuals.”79 The club’s owners
predicated these practices on their sincerely held belief that they were
“forbidden by God, as set forth in the Bible, to work with ‘unbelievers.’”80
After it was cited for violating a myriad of employment
75

Company Overview of Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., BLOOMBERG BUS., http://www.blo
omberg.com/research/stocks/private/snapshot.asp?privcapId=4165368 (last visited Sept. 1,
2015). Some have criticized Hobby Lobby’s extensive dealings with Chinese
manufacturers as inconsistent with its claimed Christian mission. Kim Bhasin, Christians
Call Out Hobby Lobby for Hypocrisy, HUFFINGTON POST (July 1, 2014, 7:32 AM)
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2014/07/01/hobby-lobby-christian_n_5545618.html
(“Products bearing ‘Made in China’ labels are found all over the shelves at Hobby Lobby,
evidence that some of its wares come from Chinese factories that have a reputation for
labor rights violations and rock-bottom wages. Employees at these facilities often end up
working grueling hours in prison-like conditions and never earn enough to escape
poverty.”). These practices are inconsistent with the tenets of my faith. See Leo XIII,
Rerum Novarum: Encyclical Letter on Capital and Labor (May 15, 1891), in 2 THE PAPAL
ENCYCLICALS 1878-1903, at 241 (Claudia Carlen ed., 1990) (recognizing that States have a
moral obligation to recognize and protect the human dignity of workers).
76
Hobby Lobby Stores on the Forbes America’s Largest Private Companies List,
FORBES, http://www.forbes.com/companies/hobby-lobby-stores/ (last visited Sept. 21,
2015).
77
370 N.W.2d 844 (Minn. 1985).
78
Id. at 846–47.
79
Id. at 847.
80
Id.
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discrimination laws, the club asserted that the Free-Exercise Clause
insulated it from liability.81
Relying on the for-profit/not-for-profit distinction long recognized
by the Supreme Court’s First Amendment jurisprudence, the Minnesota
court rejected this argument: “[The club] is not a religious corporation—it is
a . . . corporation engaged in business for profit. By engaging in this secular
endeavor, [it] ha[s] passed over the line that affords [it] absolute freedom to
exercise religious beliefs.” 82 Hobby Lobby affirmatively rejected this
reasoning.
The Hobby Lobby Court’s solicitous attitude toward the Free
Exercise rights of for-profit corporations is particularly offensive given that
the Court, in interpreting the body of law that RFRA purports to restore,
often showed significantly less enthusiasm for the claims of actual human
beings seeking much more modest exemptions from neutral laws of general
applicability; individuals that I dare say offered much more sympathetic
pleas than Hobby Lobby’s.
In 1986, the Court found that the Free-Exercise Clause did not
empower Dr. Simcha Goldman, a clinical psychologist and Orthodox
Jewish rabbi, to wear his yarmulke in his office at March Air Force Base.83
The Court denied Rabbi Goldman relief because his headwear “would
detract from the uniformity sought by the [Air Force’s] dress regulations.”84
Two years later, in Lyng v. Northwest Indian Cemetery Protective
Association,85 the Court reversed a Ninth Circuit ruling that would have
spared a six-mile-long tract of Northern California wilderness, sacred to the
Yurok people, from destruction. 86 While the Court acknowledged that
desecration of the site would “virtually destroy the . . . [Yurok’s] ability to
practice their religion,”87 the Court concluded that the Free-Exercise Clause
provided them no solace.88
Human litigants fared no better in the lower courts. The Seventh
Circuit afforded Moshe Menora, a high school basketball player and
81

Id.
Id. at 853.
83
Goldman v. Weinberger, 475 U.S. 503, 504–05 (1986).
84
Id. at 509–10.
85
485 U.S. 439 (1988).
86
Id. at 442–43, 451.
87
Id. at 451.
88
Id. at 451–52.
82
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Orthodox Jew, no exemption from an Illinois rule preventing him from
wearing his yarmulke in state-sanctioned basketball games.89
The Third Circuit, denied Alima Reardon, a public school teacher
and devout Muslim, an exemption from Pennsylvania’s “garb statute”90—a
law that barred instructors from wearing “any . . . mark, emblem or insignia
indicating the fact that such teacher is a member or adherent of any
religious order, sect or denomination.”91 The court upheld this 1895 law,
despite openly acknowledging that it was motivated entirely by antiCatholic bigotry.92
The Oregon Supreme Court affirmed a nearly identical law, likewise
inspired by anti-Catholic bias,93 upholding the termination of Janet Cooper,
an adherent of the Sikh religion, for wearing the Dastaar, the distinct
headwear of her faith, in her eighth-grade classroom.94
I believe wholeheartedly that the Free-Exercise Clause affords
human beings certain limited exemptions from generally applicable laws.95
I believe Rabbi Goldman and Moshe Menora had the right to wear their
89

Menora v. Ill. High Sch. Ass’n, 683 F.2d 1030, 1035–36 (7th Cir. 1982).
United States v. Bd. of Educ., 911 F.2d 882, 884 (3d Cir. 1990).
91
Id. at 885.
92
Id. at 894.
93
Cooper v. Eugene Sch. Dist. No. 4J, 723 P.2d 298, 308 (Or. 1986). Oregon’s antigarb statute “dates from the period of anti-Catholic intolerance that also gave us the
initiative measure against private schools struck down in Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268
U.S. 510 (1925).” Id. at 373. As Harvard Law School’s Dean, Martha Minow, observed,
these laws were the product of a particularly dark period in Oregon’s history:
In the first part of the twentieth century, nativist anxieties about waves of
immigrants and Bolshevism fueled movements to “Americanize” the
children of newcomers. These sentiments took an extreme form in
Oregon where the Ku Klux Klan, Federated Patriotic Societies, Scottish
Rite Masons, and other groups pushed not only for compulsory schooling
but also for required attendance at public schools in particular. The
reformers sounded white supremacist, anti-Catholic, and anti-Semitic
tones while pushing assimilation of immigrants into “American”
culture—meaning white Protestantism. The relative homogeneity of
Oregon may have contributed to the success of the initiative even as it
prompted civil libertarians, African-Americans, Catholics, and Jews to
build a coalition to challenge the law.
Martha Minow, Confronting the Seduction of Choice: Law, Education, and American
Pluralism, 120 YALE L.J. 814, 819 (2011).
94
Cooper, 723 P.2d at 300, 313.
95
See 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb(a)(5) (2012) (observing that Sherbert v. Verner’s protection
of the Free-Exercise rights of individuals established “a workable test for striking sensible
balances between religious liberty and competing prior governmental interests”).
90
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yarmulkes; I likewise believe that Janet Cooper and Alima Reardon had the
right to wear their respective head coverings in their classrooms. I believe
that the destruction of the ancient Yurok worship sites violated the First
Amendment.
But extending such license to for-profit corporations—to
employers—simply does not further the individual’s right to live her life
without shedding the articles of her faith. Instead, it empowers an employer
“to impose [its] religious faith on [its] employees.”96 By the logic of Hobby
Lobby, a for-profit born-again Christian enterprise not only has the power to
command an Orthodox Jewish employee to remove his yarmulke, it may
also, as a term of his employment, have the “right” to compel him to replace
it with a crucifix.
While this “right”—one that has never before been recognized in the
239 year history of our Republic97—may incrementally expand corporate
religious freedom, it does so at the expense of the religious freedom of
employees and patrons of these businesses. Hobby Lobby’s exemption from
a generally applicable federal law governing employee health care plans
illustrates this problem. 98 Hobby Lobby is about much more than birth
control.
Among the highest prerogatives recognized by my faith is the
obligation of parents to care for their children.99 Mary and Joseph fled their
homeland and went into exile to protect Jesus from Herod.100 This parental
obligation entails the responsibility to seek life-saving care if one’s child
becomes ill.101
96

United States v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252, 261 (1982).
Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751, 2794 (2014) (Ginsburg, J.,
dissenting) (“Until this litigation, no decision of this Court [has] recognized a for-profit
corporation’s qualification for a religious exemption from a generally applicable law . . .
under the Free Exercise Clause.”).
98
See supra note 15.
99
1983 CODE OF CANON LAW c.1136 (1st ed. 1999) (“Parents have the most grave
duty and the primary right to take care as best they can for the physical, social, cultural,
moral, and religious education of their offspring.”).
100
Matthew 2:13–15 (New American Bible).
101
Catholic teaching recognizes that “parents . . . have a moral obligation to protect the
life and health of their children.” FAQ on the Use of Vaccines, NAT’L CATHOLIC BIOETHICS
CTR., http://ncbcenter.org/page.aspx?pid=1284 / (last visited Jan. 30, 2016). And when no
alternative treatment is available to protect their children from dangerous diseases, this can
even necessitate inoculating their children with vaccines having a “historical association
with abortion.” Id. This is so because “the risk to public health, if one chooses not to
97
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The Government, by requiring that employers provide employees
and their children minimum health-care coverage, set out to help parents
heed this call. But Hobby Lobby—by interposing the religious beliefs of
employers between employees and their own consciences (and their
doctors)—substantially burdens individual employees’ free exercise of this
religious mandate. Consider how Hobby Lobby may impair a parent’s
obligation to care for his sick child.
If his employer—or rather its controlling shareholders—are
Jehovah’s Witnesses, his child may be denied coverage for blood
transfusions necessary to save her life.102
If his employers are Muslim, his child may be denied certain
vaccines utilizing ingredients taken from pigs.103
If his employers are Scientologists, his child may be denied access
to medications and psychiatric care if she succumbs to bipolar disorder.104
vaccinate”—and the superseding parental “obligation to protect the life and health of . . .
children”—is considered by the Church to “outweigh[] the legitimate concern about the
origins of the vaccine.” Id.; see also Jennifer E. Chen, Note, Family Conflicts: The Role of
Religion in Refusing Medical Treatment For Minors, 58 HASTINGS L.J. 643, 651 (2007).
102
Jehovah’s Witnesses believe that “[b]oth the Old and New Testaments clearly
command [adherents] to abstain from blood [transfusions].” Why Don’t Jehovah’s
Witnesses Accept Blood Transfusions?, JEHOVAH’S WITNESSES, http://www.jw.org/en/jeho
vahs-witnesses/faq/jehovahs-witnesses-why-no-blood-transfusions/ (last visited Jan. 30,
2016); accord Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. at 2805 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (“Would the
exemption the Court holds RFRA demands for employers with religiously grounded
objections to the use of certain contraceptives extend to employers with religiously
grounded objections to blood transfusions (Jehovah’s Witnesses) . . . .”).
103
Some Muslim communities believe it is impermissible for adherents to receive
inoculations containing pork gelatin, a common vaccine ingredient. Nailah Dossa, New
Influenza Vaccine Containing Pork Gelatine Has Created Outcry from Muslim Parents,
MUSLIM NEWS (Oct. 25, 2013), http://www.muslimnews.co.uk/newspaper/health-andscience/new-influenza-vaccine-containing-pork-gelatine-created-outcry-muslim-parents/;
see also Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. at 2805 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (“Would the exemption
the Court holds RFRA demands for employers with religiously grounded objections to the
use of certain contraceptives extend to employers with religiously grounded objections to
. . . intravenous fluids, and pills coated with gelatin (certain Muslims, Jews, and
Hindus) . . . .”); Al-Qur’an 5:3 (consuming pork violates God’s law); Leviticus 11:7–8
(New American Bible) (“And the pig, though it has a divided hoof, does not chew the cud;
it is unclean for you. You must not eat their meat or touch their carcasses; they are unclean
for you.”).
104
Scientologists reject psychiatric care in all forms. Why is Scientology Opposed to
Psychiatric Abuses?, SCIENTOLOGY, http://www.scientology.org/faq/scientology-in-society
/why-is-scientology-opposed-to-psychiatric-abuses.html (last visited Sept. 3, 2015); accord
Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. at 2805 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (“Would the exemption the
Court holds RFRA demands for employers with religiously grounded objections to the use
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If his employers are Christian Scientists, she may be denied medical
treatment all together.105
Men and women striving with Parkinson’s disease, like Michael J.
Fox—a member of a Jewish congregation106—may be denied access to
treatments utilizing stem-cell research if their employers are guided by the
teachings of my own Church.107
Nothing in the Constitution—or the Warren108 and Burger109 eraprecedents that RFRA purports to reanimate110—gives for-profit employers
the right to impose their own religious prerogatives on their employees in
this manner. Rather, these cases stand for the proposition that granting
exemptions from neutral and generally applicable statutes that extend
of certain contraceptives extend to employers with religiously grounded objections to . . .
antidepressants (Scientologists) . . . .”).
105
Christian Scientists generally eschew medical treatment, in favor of prayer. FAQs
on Christian Science, PRACTICAL PRAYER, http://practicalprayer.org/faqspage/ (last visited
Nov. 7, 2015). They believe that “[a] spiritual idea in Mind cannot be affected by . . .
counterfeit powers” such as “disease, injury, heredity, contagion, malfunction, deformity,
age, deterioration. . . .” Id.
106
MICHAEL J. FOX, ALWAYS LOOKING UP: THE ADVENTURES OF AN INCURABLE
OPTIMIST 196 (2009) (“It’s fair to say that I have staked a claim in Judaism. I’ve married a
Jewish girl, and we are raising our three children in the Jewish culture, and, moreover, in
the Jewish faith—our three oldest have been bar and bat mitzvahed.”); see also Nate
Bloom, Interfaith Celebrities: Michael J. Fox Receives Reform Award, Liev Schreiber
Narrates Jewish-Americans, INTER FAITH FAMILY (Jan. 8, 2008), http://www.interfaithfami
ly.com/arts_and_entertainment/popular_culture/Interfaith_Celebrities_Michael_J.shtml.
107
Catholic teaching considers therapeutic research utilizing stem cells harvested from
living human embryos “gravely illicit”:
The obtaining of stem cells from a living human embryo . . . invariably
causes the death of the embryo and is consequently gravely illicit:
“research, in such cases, irrespective of efficacious therapeutic results, is
not truly at the service of humanity. In fact, this research advances
through the suppression of human lives that are equal in dignity to the
lives of other human individuals and to the lives of the researchers
themselves. History itself has condemned such a science in the past and
will condemn it in the future, not only because it lacks the light of God
but also because it lacks humanity . . . .”
CONGREGATION FOR THE DOCTRINE OF THE FAITH 19 (quoting Pope Benedict XVI,
Address to the Participants in the Symposium: Stem Cells What Future for Therapy? (Sept.
16, 2006).
108
See generally Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963).
109
See generally Thomas v. Review Bd., 450 U.S. 707 (1981); Wisconsin v. Yoder,
406 U.S. 205 (1972).
110
Religious Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA) of 1993, Pub. L. No. 103–141, 1993
U.S.C.C.A.N. (107 Stat.) 1488, invalidated by City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507
(1997).
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privileges to employees based on the employer’s religious objections would
“permit every [employer] to become a law unto [it]self.” 111 Worse,
acceptance of such a principle would “operate[] to impose the employer’s
religious faith on the employees.”112 Respect for the democratic process—
for laws governing the correlative rights and duties of employers and
employees to one another—should be both familiar and desirable.
The Federalist Society’s most revered founding principle is a
commitment to “judicial restraint.”113 Hobby Lobby flies in the face of this
precept. It deems any act of the political branches of our Government
“presumptively invalid” that compels a corporation to act in a manner that
contradicts its professed religious beliefs, exempting for-profit enterprises
“from civic obligations of almost every conceivable kind.”114 No less a
conservative than Antonin Scalia recognized a generation ago that “[a]ny
society adopting such a system would be courting anarchy.” 115
Unfortunately, Justice Scalia did not heed his own warning. As his
intellectual adversary, Justice Ginsburg, observed, the Court instead,
“ventured into a minefield.”116
To complete Professor Wormser’s metaphor, Hobby Lobby, like
Citizens United before it, empowers the for-profit corporation—a soulless,
undead, profit-driven golem 117 —to say to the human beings and
governments to whom it owes its very existence: “You are my creator, but I
am your master; Obey!”118
111

Emp’t Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 879 (1990), superseded by statute, Religious
Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA) of 1993, Pub. L. No. 103–141, 1993 U.S.C.C.A.N. (107
Stat.) 1488.
112
United States v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252, 261 (1982).
113
See generally AMANDA HOLLIS-BRUSKY, IDEAS WITH CONSEQUENCES THE
FEDERALIST SOCIETY AND THE CONSERVATIVE COUNTERREVOLUTION 52 (2015)
(discussing the notion that a founding principle of the Federalist Society is its dedication to
themes of judicial restraint and Originalism).
114
Smith, 494 U.S. at 888.
115
Id.
116
Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751, 2805 (2014) (Ginsburg, J.,
dissenting).
117
A golem is a soulless “artificial anthropoid[] created by mystical means according
to the Jewish tradition.” Michael Broyde, Cloning People: A Jewish Law Analysis of the
Issues, 30 CONN. L. REV. 503, 520 (1998). The Torah tells “of figures made from dirt
brought to life by reciting one of the names of the Divine or by placing a piece of
parchment with God’s name (or the word emet (‘truth’)) on the forehead.” Id.
118
SHELLEY, supra note 1, at 159.

